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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
?LORA PAULL, 
Plaintijf and Appellant, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NA TI ON AL BANK, 
PAMELA B. SNOW, PHYLLIS R. 
SNOW and MELVA B. SNOW, Ad-
ministrators of the Estate of BURKE 
M. SNOW, deceased, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
10412 
This is an action for physical impairment 
claimed by plaintiff to result from care and treat-
ment given by an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Burke M. 
Snow. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Jury verdict returned and judgment entered in 
favor of the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmation of the judgment 
of the lower Court entered in his favor. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On appeal the evidence and all reasonable in. 
ferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom will be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict 
and the judgment entered thereon. Gordon v. Provo 
15 U. 2d 287, 391 P. 2d 430; Universal Investment 
Company v. Carpets, Incorporated, 16 U. 2d 336, 400 
P. 2d 564. It is, therefore, necessary to supplement 
the facts as stated by the appellant in order to set 
forth facts favorable to the position of the respon-
dents. 
Plaintiff was troubled with pain in her right 
shoulder commencing the latter part of June 1960. 
(R. 100) She was first treated by Dr. Lenore Rich-
ards July 15, 1960. (R. 87, Ex. P-2) Dr. Pau: 
Keller assumed treatment on July 29, 1960. (R. 202, 
Ex. P-2) Dr. Keller advised plaintiff to keep the 
shoulder moving; (R. 205) that it was important to 
exercise in spite of the fact that it was painful; that 
it was necessary to keep moving the shoulder because 
lack of use of the shoulder results in loss of function. 
( R. 202, 203) In addition to frequent injections of 
xylocaine for pain, (R. 202) plaintiff was given pain 
pills, anti-inflammatory pills and sedatives to de-
crease the pain so that she would persist and use the 
shoulder more. ( R. 204) Each time the shoulder 
was injected with xylocaine to relieve the pain, D:· 
Keller manipulated her shoulder around to loosen. 1t 
up. ( R. 204) Dr. Keller was concerned that the plam· 
tiff was not exercising her arm. When he would ask 
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her to move it, she was reluctant to do it and would 
i10t do it very much. The only time she moved it 
was after he injected it and then he pretty well mani-
pulated it for her. ( R. 208) 
On August 4, 1960, Dr. Keller noted that plain-
tiff's shoulder had become immobile from disuse. 
(R. 203, Ex. P-2) It was apparent to him that be-
cause of the pain, plaintiff was not exercising the 
shoulder as well as he thought she should be. 
(R. 203) On August 5, 1960, Dr. Keller asked plain-
tiff to make an appointment with Dr. Snow, but she 
actually did not go to see Dr. Snow until August 12. 
(R. 204) Dr. Keller thought plaintiff was not exer-
cising as much as was desired. He knew that in the 
long run this would have a profound effect. Anyone 
who has any ailment of the shoulder, if they don't 
·Jse it, will end up with some lack of function of the 
shoulder. (R. 205) The condition was unusual, cer-
tainly more complicated than usual and didn't re-
spond to usual treatment. (R. 209) At the time of 
trial Dr. Keller didn't think the plaintiff "uses any 
of the deltoid" muscle very much and stated that it 
could have been used if it had been exercised per-
sistently all along. (R. 207) 
When Dr. Snow first saw the plaintiff on 
August 12, 1960, there was limitation of motion and 
pain of movement of the shoulder. (R. 261) He 
stressed motion to the plaintiff (R. 159, Ex. P-2) 
and warned her that the shoulder might become 
frozen. ( R. 104) Plaintiff cancelled appointments 
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with Dr. Snow on September 6 and September 24 
(R. 263, Ex. P-2) Dr. Snow could only move plain~ 
tiff's arm to a set limit. It seemed to meet a physical 
block at that point and couldn't be raised even by 
someone else physically trying to raise it. (R. 103) 
Plaintiff was admitted to the L.D.S. Hospital 
on September 29, 1960, and told by Dr. Hahn that 
they would have to operate. (R. 95) Dr. Snow was 
listed as attending physician on the hospital admis-
sion. (R. 167) The surgeon performing the surgery 
was Dr. Hahn, the first assistant was Dr. Snow and 
the second assistant was Dr. R. J. Toll. (R. 161) In 
the course of the operation the surgeon is faced 1Vith 
the decision as to whether to quit or continue. (R. 
255) Dr. Snow, during the course of treatment prior 
to surgery, did not think actual infection was present 
notwithstanding change in color of fluid and injec-
tion of penicillin on September 3, 1960. (R. 173, 
174) There was no concern regarding infection after 
September 8, 1960. (R. 175) The plaintiff had no 
fever on admission to the hospital. (R. 243) Had 
plaintiff had a serious infection, it would have been 
likely that she would have had a temperature. (R. 
244) Laboratory report on culture of specimen of 
fluid taken from bursal sac during course of surgery 
was returned on the day following surgery. (R. 245) 
This report indicated only that there was a presence 
that could live in the human body and could cause 
infection. ( R. 268) The report on the culture was 
useful in prescribing post-operative medications. (R. 
246) 
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Dr. Toll, a practicing orthopedic surgeon (R. 
236) in Tucson, Arizona, at the time of the trial, 
IR. 237) testified that the procedures that were fol-
lowed in the course of the operation conformed to 
the standard of care followed by orthopedic surgeons 
in this area. He stated that all procedures calculated 
to protect the axillary or circumflex nerve of the 
riO"ht deltoid muscle were followed. (R. 248) 
l:> 
After her release from the hospital, plaintiff 
was follo\"ecl in the outpatient clinic at the hospital 
(R. 250) rather than by Dr. Snow. (R. 199) The 
clime arranged for physiotherapy. (R. 250) Plain-
tiff was asked to come to the outpatient clinic from 
time to time. She came infrequently and would break 
routine clinic appointments. (R. 250) Upon release 
from the hospital plaintiff was told to return for 
five or six weeks of therapy. ( R. 96) Therapy was 
daily, Monday through Friday, except for her can-
cellations. ( R. 97) Plaintiff received twenty ther-
apy treatments between the dates of October 21 and 
November 25, 1960. (R. 235) The therapist did not 
tell the plaintiff to discontinue coming. In his 
opinion she would have continued to benefit with 
respect to improved motion of her right arm had she 
continued to come for therapy after November 25. 
(R. 227) The plaintiff acknowledged that from the 
time she started therapy until the last visit to the 
therapist there was a trend of improvement and that 
she was not told to discontinue therapy. (R. 117) 
Dr. Toll testified that in the course of follow-up 
they were satisfied that she was making slow but 
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steady progress both in strength and range of motion 
(R. 252) The therapist, Steve Hucko, testified tha. 
at the time of plaintiff's first visit to therapy ther~ 
was active motion of the right arm. Plaintiff was at 
that time able to move her shoulder without any sub. 
stitution patterns in the forward, lateral and pos. 
terior movements. ( R. 222) There was a gradual 
process of improvement from the first time he saw 
her. (R. 223) 
Plaintiff saw Dr. Snow ten or twelve times 
while she was in the hospital. ( R. 96) In December 
1960 plaintiff saw Dr. Snow at the country club and 
told him she was fine and showed him how she was 
exercising her arm. ( R. 98) There is no evidence 
that he examined her at that time. She made an ap-
pointment with Dr. Snow and showed him her shoui-
der on February 21, 1961. (R. 107, 271) 
Dr. Snow by deposition testified: 
". . . Her post-op recovery was good ... 
We had her get physical therapy, and the p~y­
sical therapist was quite elated abo~t ~ne 
progress she was making. She was begmnmg 
to get her abduction back. The shoulder 
seemed to be functioning better. She was.get-
ting her strength back. And then she disap-
peared .... The next time I saw her why her 
shoulder was as it is now .... As far as I 
know, the deltoid muscle was functi?nin.g 
well the anterior and lateral part which is 
now' not functioning was working_ a~ that 
time. So that in my own mind I've ehmmated 
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any potential of having injured the muscle 
in some way in surgery." (R. 270, 271) 
Dr. Snow said that having participated in the sur-
gery and seen the patient post-operatively he would 
rule out surgical trauma as a cause of plaintiff's 
condition. ( R. 179) 
Following therapy and at the time of trial, 
plaintiff's shoulder has greater movement than was 
present prior to surgery. (R. 110, 111) The pain 
in the hospital following surgery was considerably 
less than prior to surgery and since leaving the hos-
pital, she has not required any further medications 
for pain. ( R. 112) 
In the spring of 1961 plaintiff was asked by the 
hospital's orthopedic staff to see Dr. Madison 
Thomas, a neurologist, to test the nerve functions in 
her right shoulder and to determine whether the 
nerves were damaged. ( R. 108, 109) She refused to 
submit to the test and has never done so. (R. 110) 
Dr. Burton, an orthopedic surgeon practicing 
in Boise, Idaho, ( R. 119) called on behalf of the 
plaintiff testified that Dr. Snow was negligent in 
two particulars : 
(a) in completing the operation including the 
removal of the tip of the acromion process in the 
presence of infection observed when removing the 
bursal sac for fear when you open the bone you will 
develop a bone infection. (R. 131) He stated that this 
did not cause plaintiff's condition; (R. 165) and 
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(b). damaging the nerve supplying impulses to 
the deltoid muscle some time during the surgical pro-
cedure. (R. 137, 138) 
Dr. Burton further stated that the atrophv of 
plaintiff's deltoid muscle took place as a result of 
nerve injury, that this injury occurred during sur-
gery (R. 136) and that this damage to the axillarv 
nerve was the sole cause of her present conditio~. 
(R. 148, 164) He acknowledged that muscle atrophy 
could be caused by damage to nerve supply or dis-
use. ( R. 155) On further cross-examination he stated 
that in the event of damage to the axillary nerve 
in the course of the operation, you would expect im-
mediate loss of nerve function. (R. 168) He was of 
the opinion that the surgical procedure should have 
been performed earlier. (R. 164) He didn't know 
what was done by the doctors by way of deviating 
from the standard of due care in the course of the 
surgery, other than proceeding in the presence of 
infection which did not cause plaintiff's condition. 
(R. 164, 165) He stated that as long as improvement 
continued post-operatively you would not discontinue 
therapy. (R. 167) He acknowledged that in the ab-
sence of negligence in surgery scar tissue could de-
velop within a muscle following surgery and impinge 
upon and impair the nerve which impairment would 
come on gradually and be permanent unless the scar 
tissue were removed. (R. 157, 158) 
Dr. Chester Powell, neurosurgeon, Salt Lake 
City, testified that some trauma occurs in every 
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operation. (R. 290) In the plaintiff's case the atro-
phy of the deltoid muscle was not associated with 
evidence of main peripheral nerve damage, (R. 289) 
an~, that in his opinion it was not possible that the 
axillary nerve could have been damaged in the course 
of the surgical procedure and produce this clinical 
picture. ( R. 288) 
On cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel Dr. 
Paul Keller testified that a culture is not required 
where one suspects infection, ( R. 208) and in answer 
to question of plaintiff's counsel, objected to by coun-
sel for defendants, he was permitted to say that he 
wouid have continued the same course of treatment 
as long as Dr. Snow did before putting plaintiff in 
the hospital. (R. 210) He said that only after a long 
course of conservative treatment would you consider 
any operative procedure. (R. 211) To correct the 
inference raised by plaintiff by the partial quote of 
Dr. Snow on the subject of delay appearing on page 
18 of Appellant's Brief, we set forth the full state-
ment: 
"I really don't know of any other way to 
handle it. I think possibly you might say we 
delayed too long in recommending surgery. 
But these are extremely rare cases. As I say, 
I haven't seen one for fifteen years like this. 
And with the drugs that we have, why, they 
usually will settle it down, and there isn't 
surgery needed. This just kept going on and 
on, and it wasn't until we knew for sure that 
this thing wasn't going to settle down that 
surgery seemed to me to be indicated. So I 
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don't know of any other course that could b 
taken. The only thing that I could see tha~ 
might be criticized in this treatment is oh 
som~one might say it should have been don~ 
earlier, surgery might have been done earlier 
But I don't think that anyone would. That 
criticism has never been leveled at me r 
don't know of any other way of handling lt." 
( R. 265, 266) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT. 
ING THE JURY ON THE MATTER OF CONTRJ. 
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
There is ample evidence in the record and the 
inferences to be reasonably drawn therefrom to sup-
port a finding that plaintiff was negligent in exer-
cising care and concern for her own welfare and that 
this negligence on her part was the cause of her 
present condition. 
Plaintiff was instructed by Dr. Snow to keep 
her shoulder moving prior to surgery. (Ex. P-2, R. 
104, 159) Plaintiff failed to retain the use and mo· 
bility of her shoulder by adequate exercise during 
treatment prior to surgery; ( R. 203, 205, 207, 208) 
she failed to keep scheduled appointments with Dr. 
Snow prior to surgery; ( R. 263, Ex. P-2) with the 
physical therapist subsequent to surgery; (R. ~7\ 
and with the outpatient clinic of the L.D.S. Hospita 
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after release from the hospital ( R. 250) ; she went 
to the outpatient clinic of the hospital infrequently, 
(R. 250) saw Dr. Snow only twice casually at the 
country club after leaving the hospital and told him 
only that she was fine. (R. 98) After admittedly 
observing shoulder impairment in January 1961, the 
plaintiff didn't bother to visit Dr. Snow at his office 
until February 21. (R. 107, 271) When offered the 
facilities of a neurologist for the purpose of testing 
and evaluating nerve function of the shoulder in 
April of 1961, (R. 108, 109) plaintiff refused and 
has not since submitted to such tests. (R. 110) Plain-
tiff could have had the use of her right deltoid muscle 
had she exercised persistently (R. 207) as per in-
structions. (R. 205, 159, Ex. P-2) 
Considering the evidence, plaintiff's counsel be-
latedly offered an unnumbered requested instruction 
on contributory negligence but withdrew it in view 
of the instruction the Court proposed giving. ( R. 63) 
The claimed error of ref erring to the deceased, Dr. 
Snow, as the defendant in the Court's instruction No. 
17 pointed out by the appellant is certainly not prej-
udicial so as to merit a reversal. As announced by 
Justice Crockett, speaking for the Utah Court in 
Bowden v. Denver and Rio Grande R.R., 3 U.2d 444, 
286 P.2d 240: 
". . . nor should a judgment be disturbed 
merely because of error. Only when there is 
error both substantial and prejudicial, and 
when there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have been different without it 
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shoulc_l error be regarded as sufficient to u . 
set a Judgment or grant a new trial." p 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DR. BURKE 
SNOW WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Dr. Snow said that there was no concern regard. 
ing infection after September 8, 1960, twenty-bro 
days before surgery. (R. 175) Plaintiff had no fever 
on admission to the hospital on September 29, 1960. 
( R. 243) There is no evidence that Dr. Snow sus-
pected the presence of infection at the time of com-
mencing the operation. A culture taken cturing 
surgery upon which a report was received a full day 
after the operation ( R. 245) merely established the 
presence of a bug which could cause infection. (R. 
268) The fluid could be cloudy or purulent without 
infection being present. ( R. 256) Plaintiff attempts 
to equate "entertained the possibility of infection'' 
with "suspected the presence of infection". Obviously 
infection in some form is always possible, but one 
does not necessarily "suspect" the presence of that 
which is "possibly" present. Having entertained t~e 
possibility of infection the specimen of the flmd 
taken during surgery was sent to the laboratory and 
the subsequent report thereon was helpful. in pos.t-
operative treatment. (R. 246) The only ev1denc~ m 
the record of any causal connection between p~ss1ble 
infection and plaintiff's damages was the testimony 
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of plaintiff's witness, Dr. Jerome K. Burton, to the 
effect that operating in the presence of infection did 
not cause plaintiff's damage. (R. 148, 164, 165) 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION CONCERNING CIRCUMSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff relies upon the case of Riley v. Layton, 
(CCA 10) 329 F.2d 53 (1964) as authority for his 
claim that his offered instruction must have been 
given to the jury. Plaintiff's requested instruction 
was very similar to the one in question in the Riley 
case. It must be remembered that the instruction re-
f erred to in the Riley case wa::; being considered by 
reason of the objections raised by the appellant there-
in that the said instruction did not correctly state the 
ia\v. The circuit court did not approve the instruc-
tion, but said : 
"It may be conceded that the instructions 
referred to are subject to some question when 
considered separately and apart from the re-
mainder of the charge. But in reviewing the 
instructions given to a jury we must consider 
them as a whole and not piecemeal. ... When 
the instructions here are so considered we 
think they gave the jury a correct understand-
ing of the questions which it was to decide and 
the pertinent principles of law to guide it in 
that decision which is all that is required." 
(Emphasis added) 
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So in this case the jury was adequately instruc. 
ted as to circumstantial evidence in the instructions 
as a whole and particularly in instructions 3, 5 and 
11. As suggested by the circuit court the plaintiff's 
requested instruction is "subject to some question" 
that it properly states the law in Utah. If in fact the 
plaintiff's requested instruction on circumstantial 
evidence were accepted as the standard of proof it 
would completely alter the laws of evidence of negJi. 
gence in malpractice cases in the State of Utah. See 
Marsh v. Pemberton, IO U.2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, and 
cases there cited. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING 
OF COUNSEL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE 
JURY AS TO COUNSELS' OBJECTIONS TO 
ALLOWING THE DEPOSITION OF DR. SNOW 
TO BE TAKEN INTO THE JURY ROOM. 
The court did not inquire as to plaintiff's ob-
jections, but merely asked counsel for both parties if 
there were reasons why the jury should not be al-
lowed to take the deposition saying that it was not 
permissible unless both agreed. It must be noted 
that neither counsel agreed and that both raised 
negative comment although neither objected. In the 
eyes of the jury neither party was put in an embar-
rassing position nor given an advantage. (R. 313, 
314) 
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The comment of Justice Crockett speaking for 
the court in Universal Investment Company v. Car-
pets. Incorporated, 16 U.2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 would 
seem to cover plaintiff's claim of error in this re-
gard: 
"It is neither unusual nor infrequent that 
losing counsel is beset with fears that the 
jurors have been led astray or have disre-
garded ~heir duty b~caus~ of som~ compa~a­
tively mconsequential irregularity which 
counsel may conjecture as the reason the 
jury did not agree with him. But we believe 
that such apprehensions are largely unjusti-
fied." 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING 
OF THE JURY CONCERNING THEIR PER-
SONAL FEELINGS WITH RESPECT TO CON-
TINUED DELIBERATIONS. 
The court without invading the jury's privacy 
merely inquired of the jury as to their willingness 
to deliberate longer and their feeling as to whether 
further deliberation might be useful and construc-
tive. 
In doing so the court did no more than its duty 
to see that the proceeding would result in a fair 
determination of the matter if reasonably possible. 
There was no attempt on the court's part to interfere 
with the jury's determination, to inquire into their 
position on the issues nor to coerce the jury. The 
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jury was cautioned also that they could and should 
stay with their principles. ( R. 324) 
Abstinence from interference with or coercion 
of the jury does not require the court to be incon-
siderate. 53 Am.Jur., "Trial", Secs. 950-964; Anno-
tation, 19 A.L.R.2d 1257. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIR-
ING THE JURY TO CONTINUE DELIBERA-
TIONS AFTER AN EXPRESSION FROM THEM. 
"THEY WERE DEADLOCKED." 
When the jury was sent to dinner it was told: 
" ... when a majority of you tell your fore-
man that you just think it is useless, then 
you come in and we will quit ... " (R. 244) 
The record is void of any objections raised by 
the plaintiff as to the length of time the jury 
deliberated. Surely a party should not be permitted 
to acquiesce in prolonged deliberations by a jury and 
then first raise an objection when the results of those 
deliberations prove to be adverse to that party's 
interests. A fair reading of the authorities compels 
one to observe that the trial court did not here abuse 
its discretion nor coerce the jury. 53 Am. Jur. 
"Trial" Secs. 950-964; Annotation 98 A.L.R.2d 627. 
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CONCLUSION 
"The purpose of a trial is to afford the par-
ties a full and fair opportunity to present 
their evidence and contentions and to have 
the issues in dispute between them deter-
mined by a jury. When this objective has 
been accomplished, and the trial court has 
given its approval thereto by refusing to 
grant a new trial, the judgment should be 
looked upon with some degree of verity. The 
presumption is in favor of its validity and 
the burden is upon the appellant to show some 
persuasive reason for upsetting it. Under the 
cardinal and oft-repeated rule of review, we 
will not disturb the jury's finding so long as 
it is supported by substantial evidence, that 
is, evidence which, together with the fair 
inferences that may be drawn therefrom, 
reasonable minds could conclude as the jury 
did ; and we will not reverse the judgment 
entered thereon unless in arriving at it sub-
stantial and prejudicial error was committed 
in the sense that in its absence there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that there would have been 
a different result ... . "Gordon v. Provo City, 
15 U.2d 287, 391 P.2d 430, 433 
The judgment of the trial court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. M. CHILD 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
300 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
